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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ~~ •• j 
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CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
-· 
--
.. 
. #-\ t"·-) 
ALAN J. DAVIS, Special Administrator ) 
of the Estate of SAMU EL H. ) 
SHEPPARD ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
STATE OF OHIO ) 
) 
Defendant ) 
CASE NO. 96-312322-CV 
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
INTRODUCTION 
This is the second attempt by the State of Ohio to prevent this matter from 
proceeding on the merits. The Court has already overruled the State's Motion to Strike 
and/or to Dismiss which raised similar and equally misleading arguments as to the 
nature of proceedings under Ohio Revised Code §2305.02 and Ohio Revised Code 
§2743.48. 
However, in an effort to accommodate the State's concern that this proceeding 
embody all the niceties of a civil action, the Estate of Dr. Sheppard has agreed to file the 
. 
instant action in accordance with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the 
issue of wrongful imprisonment may promptly move toward a hearing. Still, ,the State is 
attempting to "put the cart before the horse" by attempting to turn a simple proceeding 
- designed to determine whether one is indeed innocent of the offense for which he or 
she was imprisoned - into some kind of formal litigation where all kinds of procedural and 
equitable defenses come into play. 
The State would have this Court lump the two statutes together in one proceeding. 
However, the legislature, in 1986, chose to create an approach involving two separate 
courts of jurisdiction. The proceeding contemplated by Ohio Revised Code §2305.02 is 
not an action against the State, as the Defendant here would argue, but a proceeding 
to determine whether one fits the definition of a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The 
Court of Common Pleas has no authority to grant any relief against the State of Ohio -
no damage award, no costs, no equitable relief. It merely issues a finding. The Court of 
Claims, pursuant to legislative enactment, is the only court which can entertain a claim 
against the State pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §2143.48, and grant the statutorily 
defined relief. Ohio Revised Code §27 43.48(0). 1 
The fact that a common pleas court makes a determination of wrongful 
imprisonment does not automatically mean that the State must pay damages. The 
petitioner must still meet the requirements of the Court of Claims proceeding, to wit: the 
filing of an action "no later than two years after" the wrongful imprisonment determination 
by the court of common pleas. Ohio Revised Code §2743.48(H). Then, and only then, 
can the Court of Claims order the relief contemplated by the statute, and no other court: 
1 See also Ohio Revised Code §2743.02 which sets forth the waiver of the State 
of Ohio of its immunity from liability and its consent to be sued "and have its liability 
determined in the Court of Claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same 
rules of law applicable to suits between private parties ... " 
2 
The court of claims shall have exclusive, original (emphasis added) 
jurisdiction over such a civil action. The civil action shall proceed, be 
heard, and be determined as provided in sections 27 43.01 to 27 43.20 of 
the Revised Code, except that if a provision of this section conflicts with a 
provision in any of those sections, the provision in this section controls. 
Accordingly, the various arguments advanced by the Defendant such as "!aches," 
statute of limitations, abatement at death, and standing are completely inappropriate as 
this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such defenses. As stated above, the 
proceeding before this Court is not one for relief, but for a special and narrow 
determination based upon specifically designated factual, not procedural, findings 
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §2743.48(A)(1) to (4). 
Therefore this Court has a duty, based on the evidence presented, and in 
accordance with the appropriate burdens of proof, to make a determination as to whether 
Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard was a wrongfully imprisoned individual, even if the case goes 
no further than this stage. Whether his estate is entitled to money damages is a 
question for the Court of Claims, not this Court. The only possible "contest" at this point 
is a factual one, and the State of Ohio has no right to prevent the Sheppard estate from, 
at a minimum, having access to a process whereby the Court of Common Pleas can 
declare Dr. Sheppard's innocence. The legislature could not have envisioned the 
common pleas court responsibility as anything more than a brief, preliminary step toward 
correcting an injustice, not presiding over a protracted lawsuit. 
In its Brief, the State admits various critical facts which establish a wrongful 
imprisonment claim. First, it admits that Sheppard was convicted of murder and 
incarcerated nearly ten years in prison. Second, it admits that his conviction was 
3 
reversed because of the "unfairness of the trial and the prejudicial media," an injustice 
which, in part, can be shown to be the responsibility of the State of Ohio, through the 
various agents involved in the investigation and prosecution of Dr. Sheppard. Finally, it 
admits that he was found not guilty after a retrial. For most citizens, that would be more 
than enough to require reparations from their government. 
The hypocrisy of the Defendant in its attempt to turn this proceeding into a full 
blown civil action against the State, with the attendant requirements of the Civil Rules 
of Procedure, is demonstrated by its previous willingness to skirt those rules in the 
recent matter of Brian Piszczek.2 In that case, Mr. Piszczek simply moved the Court for 
the wrongful imprisonment determination, and the State consented without objections 
concerning case numbers, service of summons, etc .• The Attorney General of Ohio 
acknowledged that the determination was correct and went on to stipulate to a settlement 
which was approved by the Court of Claims. It is therefore baffling that the Defendant 
would pick and choose whatever procedural posture suits their purposes - depending on 
the circumstances. It is also interesting to note that nowhere in their Motion does the 
State suggest that there exists evidence to refute the allegations in the Petition. 
The State argues that Walden v. State, 47 Ohio St.3d 47 (1989), a case that 
discusses some aspects of the wrongful imprisonment claim, stands for the proposition 
that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings under Ohio Revised Code 
2 The Piszczek wrongful imprisonment determination complaint filed in'the Court of 
Claims and Stipulation of Settlement were previously presented to this Court in 
Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss, and would 
incorporate said attachments hereto. 
4 
§2305.02. To the contrary, all Walden concluded was that the burden of proof with 
respect to establishing innocence is the preponderance of the evidence. Walden cannot 
be interpreted to require the formal application of the Civil Rules. If so, the proceedings 
in Piszczek would be a nullity. 
There are many examples in our jurisprudence where criminal trial courts are not 
entirely strangers to the application of various aspects of civil procedure. For example, 
in post conviction proceedings, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §2953.21, the court may 
allow discovery and other historically civil methods to develop the factual record. 
Likewise, in cases with a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court conducts 
civil review of the issue of the defendant's mental state. Ohio Revised Code §2935.40. 
Additionally, in drunk driving cases, there are administrative license suspension hearings, 
' 
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §4511.191, and in forfeiture proceedings which employ 
a civil burden of proof under Ohio Revised Code §2933.43. All of these proceedings are 
conducted by criminal trial courts under the same case number as the criminal case, and 
do not require the application of the Civil Rules of Procedure. 
The State of Ohio in no way can be prejudiced by going forward with the hearing 
on the merits. It is certainly free to challenge the evidence and inferences said evidence 
may lead as far as establishing Dr. Sheppard's innocence. And, if it is unhappy with the 
determination, they can still raise all the "bars to recovery" raised in the Motion in the 
context of the action against the State in the Court of Claims pursuant to Ohio Revised 
Code §2748.73. 
5 
all these years to penetrate the resistance of the various agencies involved in order to 
piece together the truth of what went wrong 42 years ago. 
Over the years, it can be shown how information came to the authorities which 
would have pointed to a viable suspect, but was largely ignored. Moreover, since 1990, 
thousands of hours have been expended in exploring every aspect of this case. Litigation 
under the Ohio Public Records Act had to be mounted just to obtain the police reports 
from Bay Village. Witnesses, never before interviewed, were found in various states who 
had critical information regarding the innocence of Dr. Sheppard. Remarkably, it wasn't 
until 1993 that a police report was obtained which showed evidence of a forcible break 
in at the Sheppard house the night of the murder. And it was only in recent months that 
over 100 pieces of forensic evidence, never tested before, were uncovered at the 
': 
Coroner's Office, which have been sent out for new forensic examination. Even this 
Court, in an effort to obtain all remaining records and evidence in this case, issued a 
broad production order (with the consent of the State) to once and for all get to the truth 
surrounding the Sheppard case. All this information has been shared with the Cuyahoga 
County Prosecutor's Office. Every piece of evidence, every witness statement, and all 
the documentation that Plaintiff has, has been turned over to the Prosecutor's Office. 
In other words, no side, if there are sides in the context of jointly seeking the truth, is in 
an unequal position. That is why it seems so ludicrous for the State to attempt to turn 
this into some kind of adversarial proceeding. 
8 
How can the State seriously suggest that Plaintiff is guilty of "laches" or that it has 
been materially prejudiced?3 If anyone is prejudiced, it is the Sheppard family who for 
42 years had to endure a cruel system which never budged an inch in maintaining that 
Sheppard was guilty despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 
·THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT 
IS TWO YEARS FROM THE DA TE OF THE DETERMINATION BY THE COURT OF 
COMMON PLEAS. 
The action against the State specified in Ohio Revised Code §2973.48 does not 
accrue until the court of common pleas issues a determination that an individual has 
been wrongfully imprisoned. Then, according to section (H) the claimant "shall 
commence a civil action no later than two years after the date of entry of the 
determination ... " Therefore, the statute of limitations involved in this proceeding is 
built into the statutory scheme itself. No other general statute of limitations would 
obviously apply. 
The State attempts to argue once again that the proceeding under Ohio Revised 
Code §2305.02 is an action against the State for which a statute of limitations applies. 
But the actual remedial statute is Ohio Revised Code §27 43.48, pursuant to the Court 
of Claims Act, giving rise to a waiver of sovereign immunity in the context of wrongful 
imprisonment. 
3 Even if "!aches" were recognized as a valid defense, Defendant has totally failed 
to present any specific evidence that the State is materially prejudiced by the delay. 
Neither the question of liability or damages (which is strictly defined by Ohio Revised 
Code §27 43.48) changes with the passage of time. 
9 
The contention that the six year statute of limitations under 2305.07 would apply 
is erroneous since the common pleas proceeding does not create a liability. Likewise, 
the same reasoning would apply to 2305.09(0). The liability for wrongful imprisonment 
is not recognized in 2305.02, where the factual finding of the common pleas court is 
entered, but in 27 43.48, which provides the ability to sue the State for certain statutory 
damages. 
Finally, the cause of action accrues not at the acquittal, and not even when 
evidence of innocence emerges (which is still emerging in this case) but only when the 
common pleas court issues the wrongful death determination. Otherwise it would be 
impossible to pinpoint in many cases the date upon which someone becomes innocent. 
Is it when a new suspect confesses or when he is com1icted? Is it when a newspaper 
article or TV newsmagazine solves a crime? Or could it be when the petitioner discovers 
such fact? As argued by Defendant itself, acquittal is not enough. So, the only uniform 
and orderly way these actions can be fairly managed is by requiring a legal 
determination whereby the elements of what constitutes a wrongfully imprisoned 
individual are determined in a proceeding such as the one established in 2305.02. Only 
then does the cause of action accrue. 
AN ACTION PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED CODE §27 43.48 DOES NOT ASA TE AT 
DEA TH, BUT SURVIVES THE DEA TH OF THE CLAIMANT. 
Plaintiff would reiterate that the proceeding before the Common Pleas Court is not 
an action against the State which would involve the principles of sur-Vivorship or 
10 
abatement. The Estate stands in the shoes of Dr. Sheppard and has every right to seek 
the determination. 
Nonetheless, the question of whether an action survives is governed by two 
closely related statutes: Ohio Revised Code §2305.21 and Ohio Revised Code §2311.21. 
The survivor statute states: 
§2305.21 [i]n addition to the causes of action which survive at common 
law, causes of action for mesne profits, or injuries to the person (emphasis 
added) or property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall survive; and such 
actions may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or 
liable thereto. 
It should be evident that a wrongful imprisonment claim is analogous to the tort of false 
imprisonment. In the recent Supreme Court decision, Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. 
& Corr., 60 Ohio St.3d 107 (1991), the Court held that"R.C.2743.48 does not replace 
the false imprisonment tort but, rather, supplements it to allow a recovery in some cases 
when recovery was not available before." But more significant, the Court explained that 
"each day's continuance of the body of the person in custody, is a distinct trespass 
114 
Clearly, the survivor statute on its face includes the tort of false imprisonment 
because causes of actions for "injury to the person or property ... shall survive." Ohio 
Revised Code §2305.21. The Plaintiff is seeking damages for the injury to the person 
of Dr. Sheppard for the ten years wrongfully confined in prison. Moreover, the remedial 
statute, Ohio Revised Code §27 43.48 does not provide for damages against reputation 
4 
"Broadly speaking, false imprisonment is an injury to personal liberty, while 
malicious prosecution is an infringement of an individual's right to reputation." 45 
O.Jur.3d 165. 
11 
and character, and Plaintiff is not seeking such damages. 5 It would be inconceivable 
that a trespass to property would survive, but not a trespass on a person, particularly 
when the person's freedom is taken away. According to Bowman v. Parma Board of 
Education, 44 Ohio App.3d 169, a claim for psychic injury or emotional distress survived 
the death of a person, because "implicit in the recognition of tort claims for psychic injury 
of a severe nature is that such claims are claims for injury to the person which would 
survive death under R.C. 2305.21." Also, an injured party's right to punitive damages 
may survive his death and be pursued by a representative of his estate. Schaeffer v. 
D & J Produce, 62 Ohio App.2d 53 (1978). Furthermore, remedial statutes such as the 
survivorship statute are meant to be liberally construed. See, Rules of Construction 
R.C.1.1, Wright v. State, 69 Ohio App.3d 775 (Franklin, 1990); Johnson v. State, 520 
. N.E2d (Ohio, 1987). Moreover, the federal courts have analogized civil rights actions 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 as personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 
(1985). To be sure, the loss of physical liberty at the hands of the state must constitute 
an injury "to the person" as contemplated by the survivor statute. 
Thus, because the wrongful imprisonment claim survives the death of the injured 
party, the only question remaining is whether the action abates pursuant to the 
abatement statute, which states: 
5 Ohio Revised Code §27 43.48 only allows damages of $25,000 per year of 
imprisonment, loss of income, costs, and attorney's fees. There is no provision for loss 
of reputation. 
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§2311.21 Unless otherwise provided, no action or proceeding pending in 
any court shall abate by the death of either or both of the parties thereto, 
except actions for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, for a nuisance or 
against a judge of a county court for misconduct in office, which shall abate 
by the death of either party. 
An abatement statute must be strictly construed because by nature it curtails or limits 
a remedy. The Ohio abatement statute clearly admonishes that actions will not abate 
unless certain specifically named causes of actions are involved. None of the 
enumerated actions include a wrongful imprisonment claim. Therefore, not only does 
Plaintiffs action survive, but it does not abate either. 
The State raises other contentions which will be briefly addressed. First, it is 
argued the standing doctrine precludes the Sheppard Estate from pursuing a claim for 
wrongful imprisonment. It has long been held that the estate is the proper party to bring 
actions on behalf of a deceased party who has a claim at law. Johnson v. Koppers Co .. 
Inc., 524 F.Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ohio, 1981); accord, Bazdas v. Koppers Co .. Inc., 524 
F.Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ohio, 1981 ). Consequently, such argument is meritless. Second, 
it is argued that the action for wrongful imprisonment can only be brought by an 
individual because the statute uses the word "individual" and is silent on the right of 
personal representatives, heirs or assigns to bring claims thereunder. Yet, virtually all 
common law and statutory remedial actions are silent with respect to language other 
than a claimant. The body of a remedial statute is not determinative as to who may 
bring a claim on behalf of a decedent. The relevant inquiry would be through Ohio 
Revised Code §2305.21 which unequivocally provides that causes of actions for a 
decedent's personal injury shall survive. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
The proceeding under Ohio Revised Code §2305.02 is designed to make a 
specific determination as to whether an individual was wrongfully imprisoned. It is not 
an action against the State whereby the various defenses, equitable or legal, might be 
interposed. The action against the State is governed by 27 43.48 under the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Claims. Nevertheless, !aches does not apply; there is no statute of 
limitations applicable to Ohio Revised Code §2305.02 (only with respect to Ohio Revised 
Code §2743.48); the action survives, does not abate, and is properly brought by the 
estate. 
The Motion to Dismiss must be overruled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TERRYH:Gil ERT (0021948) 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Special Administrator 
of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard 
1700 Standard Building 
1370 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, OH 44113 
(216) 241-1430 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Brief in Response to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss has been hand-delivered, this -:z.. 1.-- day of ---'-Ji~U_V __ , 1996, to 
Patrick J. Murphy, Esq., Assistant Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, at his office, Justice 
Center, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113. 
TERRYH.GiLERT 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Special Administrator 
of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard 
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